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Capital Mobility, Monetary Policy,
and Exchange Rate Management in
Kenya
Stephen A. O'Connell, Benjamin O. Matum, Francis M. Mwega,
Njuguna S. Ndung'u, and Rose W. Ngugi^

8.1 Introduction
This chapter examines a pair of challenges that will confront the Central Bank
of Kenya (CBK) as the country enlists foreign capital flows in support of Vi
sion 2030. The first is maintaining macroeconomic stability - a pillar of Vision
2030 - in a context of increasing capital mobility. The second is supporting
export competitiveness in the context of large capital inflows and a major
infrastructure push.
Private capital flows can be a source of stability by promoting credit and
risk-sharing across borders. They can also undermine macroeconomic stability,
however, by exposing domestic markets to external volatility and sharpening
the trade-offs between competing objectives of monetary policy. The first half
of this chapter takes a descriptive and empirical approach to capital mobility
in Kenya. We characterize in turn the de jure and de facto openness of Kenya's
capital account, the degree to which private capital flows already influence
the environment for monetary policy, and the determinants of vulnerability
to a costly reversal of inflows. Our findings are consistent with a situation
of imperfect capital mobility, in which monetary policy can pursue multiple
targets over the short run. This scope can rapidly disappear, however, when
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targets are sharply inconsistent or when economic or political shocks interact
with pre-existing vulnerabilities. Anticipating a potentially sharp increase in
capital inflows, we emphasize the looming importance of the celebrated tri
lemma of monetary policy and the importance of prudential and regulatory
instruments in achieving a favourable balance of expected returns and macroeconomic risks. These include adjustments in the exchange control regime,
policies to facilitate private markets for foreign exchange risk, and policies to
monitor and limit macroeconomic vulnerabilities.
The second half of the chapter addresses the role of monetary policy in
supporting export competitiveness - a more controversial issue, both from a
theoretical perspective and from the viewpoint of Kenya's current monetary
framework. Policy-makers in Kenya have historically avoided severe exchange
rate overvaluation, and the cross-country evidence suggests that continuing
this record will be important in achieving the ambitions of Vision 2030. But
should the CBK actively target an undervalued shilling? Given the impor
tance of export growth for employment and economy-wide productivity, the
question deserves debate. We review the issues and conclude that, for Kenya,
the policy instruments that matter most for export success lie outside the
realm of monetary policy. These include the reliable provision of productivity
enhancing public inputs and the protection of private economic returns from
investment - policies emphasized in the economy-wide growth diagnostics of
Chapter 3. There may nonetheless be episodes during which resisting appreci
ation pressures is fully consistent with maintaining a strong inflation anchor.

8.2 Maintaining macroeconomic stability
Kenya adopted a unified and flexible exchange rate in the early 1990s, as part
of a market-based reform programme designed to improve the investment en
vironment and spur economic growth (Mwega and Ndung'u, 2008). By 1995,
these reforms went beyond the abandonment of exchange controls on exports
and imports to include the removal of a number of long-standing restrictions
on capital flows. Taking a comparative approach, we briefly document the
opening of the capital account and consider its implications for investment
and macroeconomic management in Kenya. We then turn to evidence on the
degree of capital mobility and its interaction with monetary policy.
8.2.1 Opening the capital account
Ndung'u and Ngugi (1999) describe the liberalization of exchange controls
in detail. Following the removal of interest rate controls in 1991, the CBK
introduced tradable foreign exchange bearer certificates, effectively creating a
dual exchange rate system in which the bulk of foreign exchange transactions
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continued to take place at the official rate. The free exchange rate started to
acquire greater importance as exchange controls were liberalized, but in late
1992, relations with external donors deteriorated during the run-up to the
country's first multiparty presidential election. During the first half of 1993,
reforms were temporarily reversed in the midst of a banking sector and bal
ance of pa)mients crisis. The Moi government then renewed the process in
mid-1993, and received new commitments from donors. Exchange rate unifi
cation then proceeded rapidly: during 1994, the government removed all re
strictions on current account transactions, and accepted Article VIll status in
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).^ By the middle of 1995, the govern
ment had removed many of the remaining restrictions on the capital account.
In June 1995, Parliament repealed the Exchange Control Act.
The appropriate combination of regulations and restrictions on private
capital movements remains a topic of vigorous debate among economists (Ed
wards, 2007; Obstfeld, 2008). How open is Kenya's capital account a decade
and a half after the reforms of the mid-1990s? Figure 8.1 adopts a cross-coun
try perspective, comparing a de jure measure based on official restrictions with
a de facto measure based on observed transactions. Panel 1 shows that Kenya
was an early and substantial capital account liberalizer, especially within sub-

Capital account openness

—D— SSAopen 7
------- Kenya
—SSAother 34 —Developing 72
—Industrial 21

Gross asset trade/GDP (%)

—o— SSAopen 3
------- Kenya
—SSAother 15 —Developing 36
—Industrial 17

8.1 Capital account openness, 1988-2008: de ;«re and de fflcto.
We report cross-country averages for various country groups; see the legends for group sizes, which
are smaller in panel 2 because of data limitations. Panel 1 includes all countries with a full set of
annual observations; panel 2 allows at most one missing observation. The SSAopen 7 includes all
countries with a capital account openness index at least as high as Kenya's in 2007 (see text). The
'Developing' category excludes transition economies and SSA. In panel 2, gross capital account trade
is the sum of the absolute values of debit and credit entries in the capital and financial accounts of
the balance of payments, including errors and omissions and excluding derivatives trade. Balance of
payments data are from the IMF's International Financial Statistics online.
Sources: panel 1, Chinn and Ito dataset, 2008; panel 2, IMF and CBK.
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Saharan Africa (SSA). We use the measure developed by Chinn and Ito (2008),
which relies on the detailed annual assessments of exchange restrictions in
the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Controls and Exchange Restrictions.^ By this
measure, Kenya vaulted in 1996 from the most closed 7 per cent of develop
ing countries to the most open 25 per cent in terms of capital account open
ness. As of 2007, Kenya remained one of only eight countries in SSA to fall
within the most open 30 per cent of the developing country distribution.^ Of
these eight, however, Kenya's regime was the least liberal, retaining a variety
of controls on the ability of non-resident investors to acquire assets and issue
liabilities in the local market (see IMF, 2007).
As a measure of de facto openness, panel 2 of Figure 8.1 shows the ratio of
gross trade in assets - purchases plus sales of financial claims between Kenyans
and foreign residents - to gross domestic product (GDP).* We emphasize two
observations. First, Kenya experienced a substantial once-for-all increase in
the volume of capital flows in the mid-1990s, coinciding with its relaxation
of restrictions on the capital account. Their trajectory since the mid-1990s is
flat, by comparison with increases elsewhere, an observation that corrobo
rates the impression of partial liberalization suggested by the Chinn and Ito
measure. Second, however, gross capital flows remain relatively low even by
the standards of Kenya's comparatively liberal policy regime. In recent years,
gross flows in Kenya have been well below the non-African developing coun
try average and below even the average among countries of SSA with tighter
de jure restrictions on capital movements. This may in part reflect perceptions
of country risk; we provide a rough estimate below of Kenya's risk premium
and show that it is above that of a set of comparator countries. Although the
sources of this are various, it is likely that perceptions of political instability
play a role. Of the large number of international comparisons reported by
Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA, 2009) in its
comprehensive study of national competitiveness, Kenya's relative perform
ance was weakest by far on investor perceptions of government stability.* Be
low, we show evidence of turmoil in the foreign currency markets around the
time of national elections.
8.2.2 Financing investment
Net financial trade can provide an important source of investment financing
even if two-way financial trade remains relatively modest as a share of GDP.
Figure 8.2 relates investment in Kenya to its ultimate sources in national sav
ing and net financial inflows. Foreign financing - the total amount of which,
including the use of official foreign exchange reserves, equals the current ac
count deficit - has indeed played an important role during the period of an
open capital account. This is particularly so over the past half decade, dur
ing which time a sharp increase in the investment rate has been almost fully
matched by an increase in the current account deficit.
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Figure 8.2 Investment, saving, current account deficit, and economic growth, 1996-

2008.

National accounts data in national currency at constant 2001 prices are from the World Bank, World
Development Indicators online. Gross domestic investment (1), gross national saving (GNS), and the
current account deficit (CADef) are measured as percentages of gross national disposable income.
The identity l=GNS+CADef holds. The current account deficit equals the trade deficit minus the sum
of net current transfers and net factor income. Growth is the growth rate of GDP.

The recent confluence of external inflows with increasing rates of invest
ment and growth reflects, at least in part, a vote of confidence by internal
and external investors in Kenya's economic prospects. The implied increase
in overall net foreign liabilities is nonetheless substantial, and is projected
to continue under Vision 2030. Although Kenya's external debt position is
favourable (see below), this depends in part on a combination of official debt
relief and growth rates of exports and GDP that have exceeded the real interest
rates on external debt. The global recession and financial crisis have tended
at least temporarily to reverse the latter ranking, raising questions of the sus
tainability of continued current account deficits. Aizenman et al. (2007) find
that net capital inflows continue to constitute a limited source of investment
finance for developing countries despite the sharp increases in global gross
capital flows during the 1990s. This suggests that the very substantial further
increases in domestic investment being anticipated under Vision 2030 - the
investment target is 30 per cent of GDP - will have to be financed mainly
through increases in national saving.
8.2.3 The composition of capital flows
Openness to foreign capital flows provides domestic residents with opportu
nities for diversification and may contribute to investment by reducing the
country's overall cost of capital. It also alters the environment for monetary
policy, however, by increasing the degree of de facto capital mobility. One of
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the central propositions of international monetary economics is that an in
crease in capital mobility sharpens the trade-off between internal and external
objectives of monetary policy. An extreme version of this proposition - the
so-called trilemma - states that, when capital mobility is perfect, a country
cannot simultaneously pursue an exchange rate target (an external objective)
and an interest rate target (an internal objective). One of three elements must
be sacrificed: capital mobility must be restricted, the exchange rate must be
freed, or domestic policy objectives must be ignored.
Our evidence on gross capital flows suggests that monetary policy in Kenya
is in an intermediate position - capital mobility is substantial but far from
perfect, so that the CBK has at least limited scope for pursuing interest rate
and exchange rate objectives simultaneously. However, the environment for
monetary policy is also strongly influenced by the composition of external
flows. Liquid short-maturity flows - particularly short-term debt - are wide
ly regarded as more constraining of monetary policy than long-term flows.
Their attractiveness to investors, whether domestic or foreign, can depend
sensitively on interest rates and exchange rate expectations. Their easy re
versibility, moreover, increases the risk of a 'sudden stop': a shift in market
sentiment that creates a flight away from domestic assets, such as occurred
during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and in a number of emerging mar
ket economies during the recent global financial crisis. A sudden stop gener
ates an unpleasant menu of policy choices. The monetary authority can stand
aside and allow the shilling to depreciate; it can defend the shilling by raising
interest rates; it can finance the outflow by spending international reserves;
or it can attempt to stop outflows directly, by tightening exchange controls.
The trilemma is at work here, because each of these strategies requires the
sacrifice of some domestic or external objective. Depreciation contributes to
inflation and may provoke a populist outcry from import-dependent groups
including urban wage earners; and it increases the debt burden of domestic
entities - banks, firms, or government - that have net foreign currency liabili
ties. Interest rate increases may contract aggregate demand and endanger the
solvency of net debtors, including prominently the public sector; and they
can weaken the banking sector, given the maturity mismatch between assets
and liabilities. International reserves are limited and costly to rebuild, and as
long as interest rates remain low, any perception that the central bank cannot
tolerate depreciation may redouble speculative pressures against the currency.
Tighter controls may undermine the confidence of portfolio holders further,
creating renewed pressure for outflows and discouraging subsequent inflows
once the crisis is over; and they may be difficult to remove.
Figure 8.3 provides a summary view of Kenya's external position as it has
evolved over the period since 1996. Panel 1 shows that exports of goods and
services have doubled in real terms since 2002, and that imports have grown
even faster. Aid flows began to recover in the late 1990s following a long de
cline, but they remain low as a share of overall imports. Panel 2 shows the
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1. Trade, aid and remittances

------ Imports
□ Net ODA
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▲ WRem+
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Figure 8.3 Balance of payments, 1996-2007/8.

All variables in panels 1-3 are deflated using the USA GDP deflator. Balance of payments data are
from the CBK. Imports and exports are of goods and non-factor services, and TDGSI is the trade
deficit on goods, services, and income. The NT and NKl variables are our own constructs: NT (=net
transfers) is the sum of net current transfers from the current account and 'capital account, net'
from the capital account; we call this variable net transfers because the 'capital account, net' is
composed mainly of debt forgiveness and other capital grants. NKl (=net capital inflow) is the
sum of net direct investment, net portfolio flows, and net other investments; it corresponds to the
financial account of the balance of payments. ErrOm denotes errors and omissions. Use of NetRes
(=use of net reserves) is the overall balance, with a minus sign; over this period, it is composed
almost exclusively of the reduction in net foreign exchange reserves of the monetary authority. The
following balance of payments identity holds: TDGSl=NT+NKl+ErrOm+Use of NetRes. Net ODA is
net official development assistance, from the OECD's DAC data online. Debt ratios (panel 4) are
from World Bank, World Development Indicators online.

trade deficit in goods, services, and income, along with its financing. We con
struct a broad measure of net transfers from abroad, NT, by combining official
transfers with capital grants and net worker remittances; this variable is larger
than private capital flows and large enough in some years to cover the entire
deficit. Net private capital inflows are also substantial, however; they reach a
trough in 2002 and then rise sharply until 2007, consistent with our discus
sion above. Note that the appropriate classification of remittances is unclear
here: they may well have some of the characteristics of a financial flow, in
cluding responsiveness to perceived investment returns.
Panel 3 shows the composition of net capital inflows, and leaves us with a
puzzle. Short-term non-equity flows are by far the dominant form of financ-
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ing, and in fact long-term debt flows show net repayment over most of the
period. The balance of payments data therefore suggest that the average ma
turity of Kenya's external liabilities has shortened considerably over the past
decade, a worrying trend from the perspective of exposure to sudden stops.
But, as shown in panel 4, Kenya's official external debt situation is in fact
highly favourable, both with respect to maturity stmcture and according to
standard measures of debt burden (see also Republic of Kenya, 2009). As of
late 2007, moreover, international reserves were well above the 1:1 ratio to
short-term external debt that is now regarded as a minimally prudent rule of
thumb for emerging market countries.^ An important question from a mon
etary policy perspective, therefore, is whether the short-maturity obligations
implied by the balance of payments (panel 3) present a risk of reversal that
could be activated by a change in relative yields, business expectations, or
political conditions in Kenya. The nature of these claims - including their
origin and currency of denomination - is the subject of an ongoing study by
the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and the CBK. We take an indirect ap
proach to these questions in the following section.
8.2.4 Capital flows, exchange rates, and monetary policy in Kenya
The volume and maturity structure of private flows suggests a relatively mod
est level of rollover risk, but there are numerous conduits for portfolio substi
tution including the dollarization of domestic bank liabilities, the circulation
of foreign currency in the tourist and informal economies, and the accumula
tion of offshore deposits by Kenyan residents. Rather than focus on the size
and composition of annual flows, we look in this section for the imprint of
capital mobility on monthly interest rates and exchange rates. Following a
brief review of exchange rate policy in Kenya, we begin with the most con
ventional approach, examining the evidence for an uncovered interest parity
relationship between short-term interest rates in Kenya and the world capital
market. We then constmct a measure of exchange market pressures that com
bines exchange rate movements with changes in international reserves, in
order to accommodate variations over time in how the CBK has responded to
balance of payments pressures. An analysis of the time pattern of exchange
market pressures suggests that national elections have been an important
source of balance of pa5mients volatility in the past, perhaps reflecting uncer
tainties in the electoral process and working through remittance flows as well
as through capital account transactions. We study the two-way relationship
between our exchange market pressure variable and domestic interest rates,
showing that each affects the other, as expected in a world in which market
participants respond to interest rate differentials and the monetary authority
must take cognizance of the capital account in setting domestic interest rates.
Finally, we use the September 2008 demise of Lehman Brothers, widely viewed

179

O'Connell et al.
as the event that converted a global recession into a global financial crisis, to
shed light on the determinants of ex ante vulnerability of the capital account
to external shocks.
EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
Table 8.1 documents key transitions in Kenya's exchange rate regime. Focus
ing on the most recent period, the IMF classifies Kenya as operating an inde
pendent float between 1992 and 1997 and a managed float since 1998. Rein
hart and Rogoff (2004) note that developing country central banks tend to
pursue exchange rate targets with considerably more determination than their
official pronouncements suggest - so that a managed floater might in fact be
operating a fixed exchange rate or a crawling peg for extended periods. Their
de facto empirical classification, based on observed exchange rate movements
and updated to 2007, characterizes the Kenyan regime as a crawling band with
margins of ±2 per cent or smaller.
Figure 8.4 shows the basis for this view. Following Eichengreen et al. (1994),
we calculate a monthly measure of exchange market pressures - denoted EMP
- by adding the percentage loss in reserves during the month to the percent
age depreciation of the shilling:

EMP

=

100

'

(8.1)

Here, £, is the nominal exchange rate in Kenya shillings (Ksh) per US dollar,
and R, is the dollar value of total international reserves (excluding gold, which
is virtually never used for exchange rate management). This measure is robust
to differences in a country's allegiance to any particular target path for the
nominal exchange rate. A favourable shock to the balance of payments, for
example, will induce reserve accumulation when the exchange rate is heavily
managed, and exchange rate appreciation when the exchange rate is allowed
to float freely; in both cases, the reduction in exchange market pressures pro
duces a decline in EMP.
Figure 8.4 shows the two components of EMP along with a smoothed ver
sion of EMP itself, for the period of an open capital account. Consistent with
a de facto narrow band, exchange rate movements are generally small and tend
to be accompanied by reserve losses that are larger in magnitude and in the
same direction. This evidence of active pursuit of exchange rate targets is not
definitive, however, because balance of payments conditions were favourable
over most of the period, and reserve accumulation was desirable on prudential
grounds in the wake of the 1993 balance of payments crisis and subsequent
global events (including the Asian financial crisis). Moreover, the external sit-
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Table 8.1 Transitions in Kenya's exchange rate regime, 1966-2009
Exchange rate regime
Year

Ndung'u et al.

1966

Peg to UK pound;
switch to US$ in
1971

IMF de jure
classification

RRI de facto
classification

Peg

Pre-announced peg

1970

1975

1982

Administrative
controls tightened
(1970/1)
Peg to IMF Special
Drawing Rights
(SDR)
Crawling peg to
trade-weighted
basket

1987
1991

Managed floating
Market-determined
rate'’

1992
1993

FEBCs introduced”
Independently
floating

Freely falling

Float (official
rate merged with
interbank rate)

1994
1995

Managed floating

1996

De facto crawling
band that is
narrower than or
equal to ±2%

1998

Exchange controls
(M8cN 2001)

Export retention
scheme introduced
All exchange
control regulations
suspended
Article VIII status
Foreign Exchange
Control Act repealed

Managed floating

2009
Cells show regimes starting in the year they were introduced.
a FEBCs are Foreign Exchange Bearer Certificates of Deposit; see Ariyoshi etal. (2000).
b Ndung'u (2000) characterizes the exchange rate regime from 1990 to 1992 as a dual system characterized
by an official rate and a market-determined interbank rate.
Source: M&N (2001) refers to Mwega and Ndung'u (2001). 'Ndung'u et al.' refers to M&N (2001) and Ndung'u
(2000). RRI refers to the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification, as updated by Reinhart and Ilzetski
(http://terpconnect.umd.edu/-creinhar/Papers.html); this is an empirically driven classification based
mainly on observed exchange rate movements; Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) had previously characterized
Kenya's regime as managed floating from 1994 to 2001. The IMF classification is as recorded by RRI.

uation reverses itself sharply in 2008, in the face of global food and fuel price
shocks and in the midst of post-election violence. During this episode, the
balance of payments adjustment is more evenly shared between reserve losses
and exchange rate depreciation. On balance, the evidence suggests that, dur
ing periods of relative quiescence in foreign exchange markets, the CBK can
smooth out exchange rate volatility with relatively modest fluctuations in its
intervention. During periods of greater pressure, the CBK has been prepared to
allocate a more substantial burden to exchange rate movements.
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Figure 8.4 Exchange market pressures, 1996-2008.

Pressures=EMP (smoothed). Vertical lines show presidential and parliamentary elections.
Source: CBK.
UNCOVERED INTEREST PARITY

When capital movements are perfectly free and investors can diversify away
exchange risk, a version of the 'law of one price' should hold for debt securi
ties: the expected return on claims of similar maturity, liquidity, and default
risk should be the same when measured in a common currency. This bench
mark is known as uncovered interest parity (UIP). As the expected yield on a
dollar-denominated three-month US Treasury bill, when measured in Kenya
shillings, is approximately the interest rate on that security plus the rate of
expected deprecation of the shilling against the US dollar during the threemonth holding period, the UIP condition can be stated as:

= i* + Expected Ksh / $ depreciation from t to t+ 3

(8.2)

where ij and i* are the Kenyan and US interest rates. Under UIP, the trilemma
is in full force: the country can either choose the path of its interest rate (e.g.
on domestic policy grounds) by letting its exchange rate float freely, or choose
the path of its exchange rate and leave its interest rate to be determined by
international arbitrage. It cannot act independently on the two variables, for
example by raising interest rates in order to keep inflation low while simul
taneously using foreign exchange intervention to avoid an appreciating ex
change rate.
Cross-country deviations from interest parity reflect imperfect capital mo
bility. These can in principle go in either direction; effective controls on out
ward capital movements, for example, may support a captive market for do
mestic bonds in a low-income country even when the interest rate they pay is
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below the uncovered yield on similar foreign bonds.® If controls are absent or
ineffective, however, an emerging market interest rate would be expected to
exceed a similar uncovered industrial country yield by a 'risk premium' that
reflects the less attractive liquidity, default risk, or other characteristics of the
emerging market instrument:

f, = i* + Expected Ksh / $ depreciation from t to t + 3
+Risk premium

(8.3)

Table 8.2 shows uncovered interest parity deviations - estimates of the risk
premium - on three-month Treasury bills in Kenya and a set of compara
tor economies, using US Treasury bills as the foreign asset. We employ two
alternative measures of exchange rate expectations. One is the ex post rate of
depreciation itself. The assumption here is that market participants base their
behaviour on an unbiased forecast of upcoming depreciation. As the forecast
is unbiased, the ex post rate equals the forecast plus a forecast error that has
an expected value of zero at the time the forecast is made. By construction,
therefore, the average ex post yield equals the average yield expected by market
participants, and the difference between this and the home interest rate is the
average risk premium. As an alternative, we use a simple backward-looking
rule of thumb, whereby market participants assume that annualized depre
ciation over the next three months will be the same as the observed rate of
depreciation over the previous year.
Kenya's premium is the highest of the comparison group - close to 400
basis points when ex post depreciation is used and well over 500 basis points
Table 8.2 Uncovered interest parity deviations

Unbiased forecasts (%)

Static forecasts (%)

Country

No. of obs.

Mean

Std dev.

No. of obs.

Mean

Std dev.

Uganda

156

-0.60

20.09

144

1.60

9.83

Tanzania

159

-2.07

16.20

147

-0.93

7.16

Ghana

146

1.94

42.43

134

1.88

27.59

Kenya

156

3.71

23.58

144

5.37

8.43

Vietnam

133

0.23

6.94

133

-0.02

3.78

Philippines

144

-2.01

26.86

132

-2.02

13.14

98

2.16

12.20

99

1.79

7.20

-0.51

18.42

4.24

8.45

Thailand
South Africa

159

-5.70

44.65

147 ■

Mexico

159

3.15

28.00

148

In the 'unbiased forecasts' columns, expected depreciation equals actual ex post depreciation over
the three-month holding period of the bond (t to t+3). In the 'static forecasts' columns, expected
depreciation is the observed rate of depreciation betvfeen months t and t-12.
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using the rule-of-thumb forecast. Although this may in part reflect strong pru
dential limitations on inward investment, it may also reflect concerns about
political stability, or other sources of reluctance by foreign investors - includ
ing, possibly, expectations of currency depreciation that have not materialized
over the course of the sample.
Although the size of the risk premium has implications for Kenya's debt
burden and also for the domestic cost of capital, the implications of portfolio
behaviour for monetary policy depend less on the size of the risk premium
than on the time period over which monetary policy can influence the pre
mium. If the markets demand a non-zero but constant premium from month
to month, then in practice the trilemma is at work: movements away from
the average premium will tend to be brief, and the scope for influencing the
interest rate and exchange rate separately will be limited. How tightly, then,
are domestic interest rates tied to changes in the foreign uncovered yield? In
Table 8.3, we report a set of bivariate regressions using our two proxies. The
dependent variable is the domestic interest rate. The explanatory variable is
the sum of the US interest rate and expected depreciation, using our rule-ofthumb depreciation in the upper panel and observed ex post depreciation in
the lower panel. In the latter case, forecast errors generate a simultaneity bias
even if market forecasts are unbiased; to handle this, we employ four lags of
the independent variable, dated periods t-3 to t-6, as instruments. Under the
hypothesis of uncovered interest parity, the coefficient on the uncovered yield
in these regressions should be 1 and the constant should be zero.
At the bottom of each panel in Table 8.3, we show an approximate 95%
confidence interval for the coefficient on the uncovered yield. The empirical
record of UIP is weak even among industrial and emerging market countries
(Flood and Rose, 2002), and our results are consistent with this: in no case
does the confidence interval include 1. In most cases, however, the confidence
interval also excludes zero, allowing us to reject the hypothesis that domestic
interest rates are unrelated to the uncovered US yield.
The upper panel performs significantly better statistically, and in some cas
es the differences are sharp. Kenya's is one of these - in the upper panel, the
Kenyan T-bill rate seems strongly tied to the foreign uncovered yield, suggest
ing that capital movements are sensitive to relative yields and that exchange
rate developments may influence interest rates through an expectations chan
nel. In the lower panel, however - where the maintained assumption is that
exchange rate expectations are fully forward-looking - there is little evidence
that private capital movements exert a constraint on monetary policy; we can
not reject the possibility that the coefficient is zero. In the next subsection,
we develop some further evidence on the policy environment by examining
the bivariate relationship between Kenyan interest rates and exchange market
pressures.
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Table 8.3 Interest parity regressions
KEN
TZA
GHA
Variable
UGA
Panel 1: OLS regressions on backward-looking expected yields
0.343***
0.099**
0.210***
0.079***
UNCYLD
8.12
6.20
2.38
2.71
20.627***
8.920***
9.039***
8.030***
Constant
16.86
20.5
31.79
17.57
134
144
144
147
N
0.333
0.222
0.034
0.043
5.922
9.725
3.701
3.609
RMSE

VNM
0.348***
11.09
4.600***
13.49
133
0.355
2.213

PHL
0.184***
16.58
6.382***
27.61
132
0.637
2.221

THA
-0.021
-1.57
2.583***
21.42
99
0.017
1.152

ZAP
0.048***
3.68
10.103***

MEX
0.350***
3.42
9.187***

40.29
147
0.086
2.994

14.82
148
0.193
6.282

0.028
0.068

0.150
0.550

-0.055
-0.93

-0.062
-0.62

95% confidence interval:
Lower
Upper

0.019
0.139

0.019
0.179

0.150
0.270

Panel 2: Instmmental variables regressions on ex post yields
-0.150
0.145***
0.112
UNCYLD
-1.50
4.05
1.02
22.728***
10.802***
8.629***
Constant
17.49
9.49
7.26
150
N
4.352
RMSE
95% confidence interval:
-0.108
Lower
0.332
Upper

153
3.871
-0.350
0.050

140
12.45
0.065
0.225

0.223
0.463

-0.420
-1.54
14.692***
6.57
150
12.09
-0.960
0.121

0.288
0.408

0.164
0.204

-0.041
-0.001

0.501***
3.06
3.635***

0.201**
1.99
6.258***

-0.010
-0.34
2.587***
22.63
98
1.139

133
3.802

6.68
138
5.586

0.181
0.821

0.001
0.401

3.7

-0.070
0.051

11.673***
11.73
153
3.995
-0.175
0.065

13.151***
10.14
153
7.582
-0.262
0.138

The table shows estimated coefficients and robust t-statistics (***denotes significance at the 1% level, **at the 5% level). In panel 1, the uncovered yield
(UNCYLD) is the annualized interest rate on US three-month Treasury bills in month t plus the percentage depreciation of the average Ksh/$ exchange rate
between month t and month t-12. In panel 2, the interest rate is the same, but we use the annualized ex post depreciation between months t and t+3. As a
proxy for expected depreciation, the ex post value is subject to a measurement error (the forecast error) that is correlated with the proxy and therefore a source
of simultaneity bias. As instruments, we use annualized depreciation in months f-3, t-4, t-5, and t-6. If forecasts are conditionally unbiased, these are valid
instmments because they are in the market's information set at the time forecasts are made. The 95% confidence intervals for the coefficient on UNCYLD are
approximate: the table shows the estimated coefficient minus and plus 2 standard errors. RMSE denotes toot mean squared error.
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INTEREST RATES AND EXCHANGE MARKET PRESSURES

When capital mobility is appreciable and the monetary authority seeks to
avoid excessive volatility in the exchange rate and/or international reserves,
we expect to see a two-way relationship between exchange market pressures
and domestic short-term interest rates. On the one hand, monetary policy
actions, to the degree that they operate directly or indirectly through short
term domestic interest rates, should provoke a portfolio response that mani
fests itself as a change in exchange market pressures. On the other hand, we
should see monetary policy instruments, again reflected directly or indirectly
in short-term interest rates, responding to exogenous changes in exchange
market pressure with a view to moderating the impact on the exchange rate
and/or reserves. The latter relationship underlies the 'interest rate defence' of
a currency facing speculative outflows.
In this section, we estimate reduced form dynamic models to characterize
the relationship between Kenyan interest rates and exchange market pres
sures, conditional on foreign interest rates. These bivariate vector autoregres
sions (VARs) take the form;
(8.4)
where x, is a 2x1 vector composed of the Kenyan interest rate and BMP,
A. (2x2) and C. (2x1) are matrices of reduced form coefficients, and e, is a

2x1 vector of shocks or 'innovations' to the dependent variables. We are
interested, first, in patterns of causality between the two variables, which
we assess using tests of Granger causality. These tests ask whether lagged
values of the Kenyan interest rate add predictive power to lagged val
ues of BMP in forecasting future BMP - in this case, the Kenyan inter
est rate is said to 'cause' BMP - and similarly for lagged values of BMP in
forecasting future interest rates. We then use the estimated equations to trace
out the time path of how each variable responds over time to an unexpect
ed one-time change or 'innovation' in the other. Under the assumption that
the innovations correspond to shocks to monetary policy and the balance
of payments, respectively, these impulse responses indicate the direction,
magnitude, and persistence of influences from monetary policy shocks to the
balance of payments - given the high frequency of our data, most probably
through portfolio effects - and from balance of payments shocks to monetary
policy.
We estimate two separate VARs, involving in turn the three-month T-bill
rate and the repo rate in Kenya. We estimate with twelve monthly lags, and
in each case we include the relevant US interest rate - the three-month T-bill
rate, and the Federal Funds rate respectively - as an exogenous variable in the
VAR.
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Impulse responses: Repo rate and EMP
Response of EMP to interest rate

Response of interest rate to EMP

Step
Impulse responses: T-bill rate and EMP
Response of EMP to interest rate

Response of interest rate to EMP

Figure 8.5 Impulse responses: interest rates and exchange market pressures in Kenya.
The figures show responses to a shock equal to one standard deviation of the relevant innovation;
steps are in months. Upper and lower bounds show the estimated effect plus and minus two standard
deviations. The underlying bivariate VARs have twelve monthly lags and include as exogenous
variables a set of centred monthly dummy variables and the current value and twelve lags of the
relevant US interest rate (the Federal Funds rate in the repo case and the three-month T-bill rate in
the T-bill case). We assume in both cases that the interest rate innovation is causally prior to the EMP
innovation, so that innovations in the domestic interest rate affect EMP in the month they occur,
whereas the interest rates respond to EMP only with a one-month lag (the qualitative results are not
sensitive to the choice of ordering).

In both cases, the causality evidence is very strongly consistent with a twoway relationship between the interest rate and exchange market pressures.
We reject the hypothesis of no Granger causality from the interest rate to
EMP, and also from EMP to the interest rate, and in both cases the signifi
cance level is well below 1 per cent. Figure 8.5 shows the impulse responses,
using the repo rate in the upper panel and the T-bill rate in the lower. These
indicate a statistically significant short-run response of each variable to the
other. The direction of these responses is consistent, on the one hand, with
a conventional portfolio response to changes in domestic monetary policy:
a monetary tightening produces a short-run reduction in exchange market
pressures. In the other direction, the impact of exchange market pressures
on the interest rate is consistent with a monetary policy that seeks to reduce
exchange rate volatility by responding to shocks to the balance of payments.
The second of these effects is stronger and more persistent, and is estimated
more precisely.^
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DETERMINANTS OF VULNERABILITY: SOME EVIDENCE FROM A GLOBAL
FINANCIAL SHOCK

Monetary policy has two very different responsibilities with respect to the
exchange market volatility associated with capital inflows. The responsibility
for handling shocks as they occur falls within the domain of conventional
monetary policy. The evidence we have provided thus far suggests that capital
flows already exert a significant impact on the conduct of monetary policy
in Kenya. An important complement to this ex post responsibility, however,
is the challenge of managing the country's ex ante vulnerability to shocks.
What factors determine a country's vulnerability to a costly reversal in capital
flows? An extensive literature investigates this question in the case of indus
trial and emerging market countries: we have already mentioned short aver
age maturities, currency mismatches, a preponderance of debt liabilities over
equity liabilities, and inadequate reserve coverage as potentially important
correlates of vulnerability (Obstfeld, 2008). Less is known, however, about
the relevance of these and other determinants for pre-emerging economies
such as Kenya's. In this section, we treat the collapse of Lehman Brothers on
15 September 2008 as an exogenous shock to global capital markets, and ask
what variables helped to determine the vulnerability of developing countries
to a sharp increase in exchange market pressures. Our purpose here is narrow;
we are not seeking to determine the overall impact of the global crisis, which
emerged over a longer period and, within Africa, primarily via export markets.
We are instead exploiting the unanticipated and dramatic nature of the Leh
man Brothers collapse to isolate asset market pressures on the exchange rate
and infer the sources of vulnerability to such pressures.
Rose and Spiegel (2009) find that most of the variables suggested by the
literature have little or no success in predicting which countries were hit hard,
and which were not, by the global financial crisis. Our exercise differs from
that of Rose and Spiegel in some important ways, however, most notably in fo
cusing on a well-defined and limited aspect of the crisis - its immediate shortrun impact on the foreign exchange market (Rose and Spiegel construct a
'crisis' variable that combines changes over the course of 2008 in real GDP, the
stock market, country credit ratings, and exchange rates). Reflecting our focus
on emerging and pre-emerging economies, moreover, our sample excludes the
industrial countries altogether and includes all of the non-industrial countries
for which data are available. Nonetheless, the Rose and Spiegel results suggest
that modest expectations are appropriate in this exercise, which we view as an
exploratory first cut.
To construct our dependent variable, we make three important changes
to EMP. First, consistent with our earlier results for Kenya, we expand the
definition of exchange market pressure to include the change in the domestic
discount rate, i,:
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EMP+ = 100*(«,

(8.5)

We do this to avoid masking the effect of the shock in countries that adopt
ed an interest rate defence, raising domestic rates in order to contain the im
pact on reserves and/or the exchange rate.'° Second, we study the change
in EMP+ rather than its level, in order to avoid confounding the impact of
the global crisis with pre-existing country-specific trends in exchange mar
ket pressure. Finally, to control for structural differences in exchange market
volatility across countries, we normalize each country's change in exchange
market pressure by the historical standard deviation of such changes for that
country. Our dependent variable, denoted LBE for 'Lehman Brothers effect',
is therefore:
LBE, = AEMP,"(October 2008)/ct,(AEMP*)

(8.6)

where <t,(EMP^) is the country-specific standard deviation of EMP+ calculated
over the period 2000-07.
Note that we focus on changes over the course of October rather than Sep
tember 2008.^' Although the Lehman Brothers event is widely viewed as a
turning point, this is with the benefit of hindsight. Figure 8.6 shows the distri
bution of exchange market pressures among emerging market countries, and
shows that the global recession became a global crisis only in October. Our re
gressions seek to uncover the determinants of this shift at the country level.
To avoid reverse causality, we restrict attention to initial conditions that
were established by or before 2007. We therefore run a set of cross-sectional
regressions of the form:
LBE, =a + (3 *X;(2007) -f 7^controls,(2007) +

(8.7)

where x. is a variable suggested by the literature as a measure of ex ante vulner
ability. All regressions include the log of real GDP per capita, to control for
level of development, and the log of population, to control for country size.
Table 8.4 reports the estimated values of p along with robust t-statistics.
Table 8.4 tentatively confirms the potential relevance of a number of the
vulnerability measures suggested in the literature. The ratios of M2 and short
term external debt to international reserves are alternative measures of im
plicit claims on the central bank's liquid reserves. Higher values of these in
2007 predict the Lehman Brothers effect at a significance level of 10 per cent
or better. The capital-to-asset ratio of banks in 2007, and an indicator of the
rate of expansion of bank balance sheets between 2005 and 2007 (the increase
in the domestic credit to GDP ratio) also predict balance of payments pressure
at close to conventional levels of significance. The Kraay-Nehru debt distress
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2001-07

------ September 2008

------ October 2008

Figure 8.6 Lehman Brothers and the global distribution of EMP, non-industrial
countries.

The kernel densities are smoothed histograms of the cross-country data for twenty-one emerging
market countries.

indicator is particularly relevant for the pre-emerging countries in the sample.
It defines a distress episode as one during which the country had substantial
arrears on external debt, received debt relief from the Paris Club group of
bilateral creditors, or received substantial balance of payments support from
the IMF.'^ This variable is available only to 2002, and as a predictor we use the
proportion of years between 1990 and 2002 classified as distressed. In princi
ple, this variable operates both as a predictor of continuing exposure to debt
distress and as a proxy for adverse reputational effects from earlier episodes.
Higher values were associated with larger exchange market pressures. Finally,
the size of net capital inflows immediately preceding the crisis - captured by
the current account deficit — carries a positive point estimate, but not a sig
nificant one at conventional levels. Results for the two control variables are of
varying statistical significance but consistently positive in sign; they suggest
that richer and larger countries tended if anything to be harder hit, consistent
perhaps with their more sophisticated financial systems.'^
A number of variables identified as potentially relevant in the literature
did not prove significant in predicting EMP. These include measures of real
exchange rate overvaluation; World Bank assessments of the quality of eco
nomic policy; ratios of bank liquid reserves to assets; non-performing loans,
and the ratios of debt and debt service to exports or GDP. The Chinn and Ito
capital account openness indicator enters with a positive but statistically in
significant coefficient.
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Table 8.4 Determinants of the Lehman Brothers effect
Dependent variable: September 2008-0ctober 2008 change in normalized EMP* calculated using US$ exchange rates

Result
log(y pet capita)

Individual OLS regressions on x, variables:
Ratio of
Share of
short-term
external debt
short-term
Ratio of M2 to
to international debt in total
international
external debt
reserves
reserves
2007
2007
variables only 2005-07
0.0286
0.0848
0.3399
0.2794

Increase in
domestic
credit as share
of GDP
2007
0.3876

Commercial
banks' capital/
asset ratio
2007
0.4209

Average value
of KraayNehm (2006)
debt distress
indicator
2007

Current
account
deficit
1990-2002

0.2046

0.4137

1.51

1.40

2.25

robust f-stat

2.24

1.90

0.61

0.15

2.39

P value

0.03

0.06

0.55

0.88

0.02

0.14

0.17

0.03

logfpopulatlon)

0.112

0.2003

0.1798

0.0778

0.1273

0.1201

0.0646

0.1639

1.65

0.81

0.66

1.80

0.51

robust t-stat

1.24

2.56

3.20

0.86

P value

0.22

Coefficient on x.
robust t-stat
P value

N

0.08

0.01

0.00

0.39

0.10

0.42

_

0.2135

0.0035

0.0336

-0.0246

-0.1342

0.0177

-0.0146

-

1.66

1.27

-1.51

-1.60

1.72

-1.34

-

68

0.10
67

19.02
0.00
57

0.21
57

0.14
67

0.12
38

0.09
60

0.19
62

R2

0.0765

0.1962

0.4126

0.1392

0.1215

0.1196

0.1756

0.0870

RMSE

1.403

1.329

1.097

1.328

1.390

1.329

1.275

1.433

Standardized Kenya
residual

0.2136

0.0326

0.0371

0.1393

0.1804

0.5786

-0.4620

0.2648

Sample sizes are determined by data availability, and industrial countries are excluded. For Kenya, we use the repo rate as a discount rate is not available. The
standardized Kenya residual is Kenya's residual divided by the RMSE of the regression. The domestic credit variable is the increase in the percentage ratio of
total commercial banks' domestic credit to GDP between 2005 and 2007. The Kraay-Nehm variable Is the proportion of years from 1990 to 2002 when the
country was classified as debt distressed by Kraay and Nehru (2006). Real GDP per capita is in constant international dollars. All variables except the KraayNehm indicator are from World Bank, World Development Indicators online. RMSE denotes toot mean squared error.
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8.2.5 Summarizing
Vision 2030 anticipates a substantial contribution from foreign capital in
flows. The period from 2003 to 2007 illustrates the favourable interactions
that are central to sustaining such a strategy: domestic reforms supported a
combination of inflows and rising investment; strong growth in exports and
GDP produced stable or improving creditworthiness despite a buildup of for
eign liabilities; and the central bank was able to pursue price stability while
limiting the short-run volatility of the exchange rate. The global financial
crisis, however, illustrates the urgency of some of the concerns we have raised
in this section. First, the composition of Kenya's external liabilities is an im
portant determinant of the country's exposure to macroeconomic instability
from sudden reversals. Given ongoing uncertainties in international financial
markets and in the domestic political realm, it is a priority that the facts in this
area be better established. Second, Vision 2030 anticipates a central role for
foreign direct investment (FDI), both in the infrastructure area and in support
ing export diversification. In the absence of direct restrictions on FDI, aspects
of the overall investment environment are the most crucial determinants of
the rate of inward investment.We have nonetheless noted that, although
the reforms of the mid-1990s removed direct restrictions on FDI, the impact of
lingering controls on financial transactions by non-residents may be substan
tial. In contrast with controls on short-term international borrowing, which
are largely absent, these do not have an obvious pradential justification.
Adequate justification may of course lie elsewhere, but on macroeconomic
grounds, the balance between these two types of control should perhaps be
revisited. Third, the cross-country evidence emphasizes the overriding impor
tance of domestic saving, even in a world of high capital mobility; we return
to this point below. Finally, the degree of capital mobility has an important
effect on the environment for monetary policy. We have taken a variety of ap
proaches to assessing the relevance of the trilemma in Kenya, recognizing that
balance of payments flows are difficult to measure and classify with precision.
Our results suggest that short-run capital mobility is imperfect but substantial
in Kenya; we believe it is likely to be even greater in the years ahead. This
places a premium on central bank activities that lie outside of conventional
stabilization policy, including effective prudential oversight of the banking
system and regular assessment of the capital controls regime.

8.3 Supporting external competitiveness
Central banks worldwide have placed increasing emphasis over the past two
decades on the objective of price stability. In theory, at least, this is not a
choice of stability over development. Instead, it reflects an intellectual consen-
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sus that monetary policy makes its best contribution to long-run development
by maintaining relatively low inflation and a strong financial system. As out
lined in Chapter 7, this consensus favours a system of 'constrained discretion'
in which the pursuit of short-run goals by the central bank is subordinated
to the maintenance of an anchor for private sector expectations of inflation.
According to this consensus, market participants must understand that, when
conflicts arise between price stability and competing 'real' objectives - includ
ing low public sector borrowing costs, high employment, or a competitive
real exchange rate - the central bank will give first priority to price stability.
These principles are strongly reflected in a succession of Central Bank Acts in
Kenya, dating from 1996, and also in the Vision 2030 documents with their
prominent emphasis on macroeconomic stability.
We saw in Section 8.2 that, although private capital mobility is consider
able in Kenya, the CBK is not yet in the throes of the trilemma. A combina
tion of imperfect asset substitutability, prudential regulations, and residual
capital controls appears to give the CBK scope to target inflation while also
exerting some influence over the path of the nominal exchange rate. As do
mestic wages and prices move more slowly than the exchange rate in the
absence of intervention, the CBK has a handle - certainly in the short run and
perhaps for extended periods - not just over the nominal but over the real ex
change rate, defined here as the domestic relative price of non-traded to traded
goods.Calvo et al. (1995) characterize the real exchange rate as 'probably
the most popular real target [of monetary policy] in developing countries'
(p. 98).^*’ They also warn, however, that targeting the real exchange rate typi
cally comes at a cost in terms of other objectives. How aggressively should the
CBK pursue real exchange rate targets?
8.3.1 Reducing volatility

It is important to distinguish two t)T)es of exchange rate objective. The first
- and less controversial - is limiting extreme short-run appreciations or de
preciations. In thin markets, these can be driven by large temporary shocks to
the current or capital account. As capital mobility rises, however, the capital
account looms larger: herd behaviour may amplify the response to news of
any kind, and exchange rates may overshoot when adjusting to changes in
monetary policy whether at home or abroad.
There are good reasons to intervene to limit short-run volatility. These
include avoiding excessive instability in aggregate demand, especially when
banks or other domestic residents may have open positions in foreign ex
change (Obstfeld, 2008); avoiding severe liquidity problems for firms when
credit markets are weak and costs and revenues are on different sides of the
traded/non-traded divide (e.g. for exporters of labour-intensive goods or serv
ices); and limiting exchange rate risks when foreign exchange markets are
thin and instruments for hedging these risks are absent. The last two consid193
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erations are particularly relevant when domestic financial markets are poorly
developed. This may help to explain our earlier observation that central banks
in emerging market and low-income countries routinely intervene to limit
exchange rate volatility, even when the official stance of policy is that the
exchange rate is floating (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). We have seen evidence
of this phenomenon in Kenya throughout this chapter, including the de fac
to classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (Table 8.1), which suggests a narrow
crawling band rather than the official stance of a managed float.'^
Of course, any volatility reduction strategy faces the practical problem of
deciding when to intervene and for how long. Capital mobility makes this
more difficult, because on top of the difficulty of distinguishing transitory
from permanent shocks, the central bank must contend with private sector
expectations about the onset and abandonment of intervention. Too great
an allegiance to any predetermined path for the exchange rate risks activat
ing the trilemma. When pressures push the currency to the weak side of the
central bank's notional band, a targeting policy can produce a currency crisis.
The key issue from the viewpoint of the monetary framework, as emphasized
in Chapter 7, is that, when conflicts arise between the provision of a nominal
anchor and exchange rate objectives, the nominal anchor comes first.
Particularly in low-income countries, central banks with flexible exchange
rates also face a tension at the level of policy design, in determining the de
gree of volatility they are prepared to tolerate. We emphasized above that the
welfare benefits of reducing volatility may be greatest when domestic finan
cial markets are weak. Consistent with this, Aghion et al. (2006) find that the
impact of real exchange rate volatility on economy-wide productivity growth
is essentially zero for countries with highly developed financial markets, but
negative and statistically significant for countries at low levels of financial
development.'® The gains from limiting volatility may therefore be strong,
particularly for activities that the government finds it difficult to support via
other means, including non-traditional exporters and/or small to medium
sized enterprises who lack access to existing financial markets. But a reduction
in exchange rate volatility also undermines the incentive for private agents
to develop the financial markets and instruments for managing that volatil
ity.The short-run benefit may therefore come at the cost of a less vibrant
and growth-oriented financial sector. The appropriate balance is a matter of
judgement, and in any case exchange rate policy should be complemented
with direct efforts to foster the development of efficient and well-regulated
financial markets.
8.3.2 Real exchange rate trends

Our main focus, however, is on strategies that target an undervalued real ex
change rate. In an appendix,^® we develop a simplified version of the work
horse non-traded goods/traded goods model to illustrate the influence of the
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real exchange rate on export competitiveness. A real appreciation increases the
profitability of firms producing for the domestic market, drawing labour and
other mobile resources out of the production of exports. If the export sector is
already too small from the perspective of long-run growth, real appreciation
worsens this distortion and creates potentially serious welfare losses (Rodrik,
2008). Any impact on the investment environment for exports compounds
these losses over time.
Real exchange rate targets are an active source of discussion in Kenya, where
export performance has improved since 2002 but continues to fall short of the
ambitions of Vision 2030. Pollin and Heintz (2007) have recently called for
a reassessment of monetary policy with a view to achieving a more depreci
ated shilling. The underlying argument is that the sectors favoured by real
depreciation - those that produce either directly (exports) or indirectly (im
port substitutes) for the world market - include some that are 'special' from a
development perspective, due to the quantity and quality of jobs they create
and, perhaps especially, the productivity spillovers they deliver to the rest of
the economy. These sectors are suboptimally small, it is argued, in the absence
of a real exchange rate policy: their expansion, even at the cost of other activi
ties, would generate economy-wide gains.
The 'principle of policy assignment' states that the best approach to a mar
ket failure is generally to attack the problem at its source. Examples include
removing the labour market rigidities that generate underemployment, and
directly subsidizing industrial activities that generate learning-by-doing. The
argument for a weak real exchange rate is therefore what economists call sec
ond best: its validity is context specific and depends not just on the presence
of a market failure but on the absence of a viable first-best policy approach.
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) interpret an undervalued currency as a secondbest form of industrial policy, for countries with relatively weak government
institutions and with potential comparative advantage in manufactured ex
ports. The argument is that the manufacturing sector is a source of productivity
spillovers that are external to the firm and therefore subject to market failure.
The 'first-best' or optimal policy is to subsidize exports directly, and particu
larly non-traditional exports; but this requires both ample fiscal resources and
institutions that are capable of combining subsidies with strong pressures to
succeed. A weak but unified exchange rate, they argue, delivers incentives for
export diversification without promoting rent-seeking or requiring an unreal
istic degree of public sector capability for industrial policy.
Panel 1 of Figure 8.7 suggests the locus of concerns over exchange rate com
petitiveness in Kenya. We show three concepts of the real exchange rate. The
most commonly used is the multilateral real effective exchange rate (REER),
calculated as a trade-weighted average of bilateral external real exchange rates
with Kenya's main trading partners (of which the USA and the Euro zone are
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Figure 8.7 Kenya and third-party exporters.

,

,

,

Panel 1- REER is the CBK's trade-weighted real exchange rate, built up from country-level real
exchange rates of the form r,=CPI,,,J(E,-CPl), where E, is the bilateral
“
Ksh per unit of currency of country i (each bilateral index is converted to 2000=100). Ihe CBK
applies separate weights to imports and exports for Kenya's eight largest trading partners (USA, the
Euro area. South Africa (imports), the UK, India, Japan, Uganda (exports), and Tanzariia (exports)).
REER3p is a simple average of Kenya's CPI-based bilateral real exchange rate indices vis-a-vis Brazil,
Chile, China, India, Malaysia, and Tunisia.
^
Panels 2-6: Growth of nominal dollar exports; growth of constant local currency GDP. Gross
(domestic) saving=GDP-private consumption-government consumption. Gross investment-gross
fixed capital formation. CA surplus=trade surplus+net factor income-met unilateral transfers
received. The number of third-party exporters in paneis 2-6 varies depending on data availability.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators online.

by far the largest). The underlying bilateral real exchange rates are measured
here as Kenya's consumer price index divided by the foreign consumer price
index, converted to Kenya shillings at the relevant bilateral official exchange
rate. As the price indices refer to different baskets of goods, only changes in
the REER, not its level, are meaningful; we have arbitrarily set the level to
100 in 2000. Eigure 8.7 shows that the REER has appreciated substantially
since 2002, in line with the deterioration in the trade balance over the same
period (recall Figures 8.2 and 8.3). These two phenomena are of course closely
related. There is ample evidence that trade flows respond to the real exchange
rate, both across developing countries and in Kenya (Ghei and Pritchett, 1999;
Mw'ega and Ndung'u, 2001; Were et al., 2002). It is also well established empir
ically that a surge in net capital inflows tends, in the short run, to produce an
excess demand for non-traded goods and a real appreciation (the label 'Dutch
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disease' applies to the resulting loss in competitiveness of dynamic export sec
tors; see Edwards, 1989; Hinkle and Montiel, 1999).
Panel 1 of Figure 8.7 also examines Kenya's exchange rate competitiveness
vis-a-vis a set of six third-party exporters, using this term to refer to develop
ing countries whose exports have grown rapidly in recent years and may pose
formidable challenges to Kenyan exports in major industrial country markets.
These include some of the economies routinely cited in support of the posi
tive externalities to producing manufactured goods for world markets. Some
of these countries, e.g. China and Tunisia, are known not just for their export
success but also for their aggressive pursuit of real exchange rate targets. Kenya
shares some important features with these economies, including labour abun
dance, a coastal location, and a tradition of relative macroeconomic stability.
In some other respects, including relative endowments of human capital ver
sus natural resources, the credibility of government commitments to export
competitiveness, and perceived political stability, Kenya's situation appears to
differ substantially.
Panel 1 shows the average bilateral external real exchange rate index
against these third-party competitors, again set arbitrarily to 100 in 2000. This
measure is directly comparable to the REER except in its country composition
and its use of a simple rather than a weighted average. It is clear that Kenya's
real exchange rate has appreciated even faster relative to the third-party group
than it has with respect to its trading partners.^^
8.3.3 Targeting an undervalued shilling: strategic considerations

Globally, country episodes of sustained rapid growth since 1960 have typical
ly been accompanied by sharp increases both in the share of manufacturing
in exports and GDP and in the share of exports in GDP (Eichengreen, 2008).
What role does monetary policy have in achieving this outcome?
We briefly develop four points. First, although Kenya has judiciously avoid
ed acute overvaluation over the years, the empirical literature has become
increasingly favourable to the view that undervaiued exchange rates are good
for growth. Second, however, the real exchange rate is oniy one of many de
terminants of export performance in Kenya, and probably not the most im
portant. Third, the issue of appropriate policy assignment is important. Fiscal
policies are far more prominent than monetary policies in determining the
real exchange rate in the medium to long run, and within the domain of
monetary policy, regulatory policies should not be overlooked in the midst of
debate over policies that operate directly on the exchange rate. Finally, both
theory and evidence suggest that using conventional monetary policy instru
ments to target a depreciated real exchange rate requires the central bank to
accept a higher rate of inflation.
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THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE AND GROWTH

In a recent survey of the evidence on real exchange rates and growth,
Eichengreen (2008) concludes that an undervalued exchange rate can facili
tate growth, particularly in the early stages of a growth acceleration. Rodrik
(2008) takes a stronger position, arguing on the basis of panel evidence that
undervaluation positively promotes growth. Both authors acknowledge that,
although the underlying mechanisms are not fully understood, the observed
correlations rely strongly on the expansion of manufactured exports in a suc
cession of fast-growing Aslan economies, both before and after the Asian fi
nancial crisis of 1997. The most prominent recent example is China. Dooley
—et al. (2007) interpret China's currency policy as an attempt to attract FDI in a
situation of rural labour surplus. The strong currency keeps the cost of labour
low in dollar terms, encouraging inward investment, which generates rapid
growth of employment, exports, and GDR
These assessments are less agnostic than earlier literature, which argued
that, although acute overvaluation was damaging to growth, modest levels of
over- or undervaluation had little systematic impact (e.g. Razin and Collins,
1999). The classic form of acute overvaluation arises in a managed exchange
rate regime when the monetary authority attempts to maintain a non-inflationary path for the exchange rate while providing the government with easy
— monetary finance. As long as the rate of inflation implied by the government's
demand for monetary finance exceeds the rate of crawl of the exchange rate,
the situation is unsustainable. The domestic relative price of non-traded goods
rises relative to the prices of traded goods, which are held down by the nomi
nal exchange rate; the booming non-traded goods sector draws labour and
other productive resources out of the increasingly non-competitive export
sector, and exports fall; imports rise, particularly as the private sector comes
to understand that the period of cheap imports is likely to be temporary. The
trade balance worsens, and external liabilities accumulate. The central bank
may tighten exchange controls in the hope of stemming reserve losses, but
— unless the macroeconomic fundamentals are corrected - in this case, via fiscal
adjustment - a currency crisis ensues, forcing the central bank to give up its
exchange rate objective and accept higher inflation.
Although we have argued that the CBK pays attention to the path of the
exchange rate, the danger of an acute overvaluation driven by fiscal accom
modation and aversion to devaluation seems remote. In contrast to its neigh
bours, Kenya did not allow its exchange rate to become sharply overvalued
during the 1970s and 1980s. This in turn reflected, in part, a stronger tradition
of fiscal discipline - as witnessed, for example, in the substantial adjustment
of the fiscal balance and domestic saving in the face of declining external
-- capital flows during the 1980s. But it also reflected a willingness to devalue
the official exchange rate - and tolerate the resulting open inflation in the
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prices of traded goods - rather than allowing the parallel premium to get
extremely large and suffering the attendant distortions.^^ This commitment
was buttressed in 1994 by Kenya's acceptance of the obligations of Article
Vlll status in the IMF. Moreover, any existing willingness to allow necessary
exchange rate adjustments to take place, rather than resisting them, has be
come progressively easier since the mid-1990s, as firms and financial markets
have come to expect some degree of exchange rate adjustment in response to
shocks.^^
SOURCES OF EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS

Although the growth evidence is somewhat more favourable than previously —
to the positive impact of undervaluation, the real exchange rate is only one
of many determinants of export performance. We develop this point in the
appendix (see note 20), by analysing the investment environment for exports
within a version of the classic traded goods/non-traded goods model. Along
with the real exchange rate, the model emphasizes a wide range of determi
nants of costs and productivity, including tariff rates on imported equipment,
explicit taxes and bureaucratic predations on the export sector, and the cost
and quality of public infrastructure capital and public services.
KIPPRA (2009) adopts a holistic perspective that is fully consistent with
our analysis. Of the four key competitiveness priorities stressed in the KIPPRA —
report - education and training, the business environment, technology and
innovation, and infrastructure development - monetary policy enters only in
the second, and there not through the value of the shilling but through the
favourable impact of macroeconomic stability on the business environment.
We return below to whether targeting a weak shilling will enhance macroeco
nomic stability; the answer is much less clear than in the case of avoiding
acute overvaluation. But a targeting policy should always be viewed (if at all)
as a complement to action in these microeconomic and institutional arenas,
not as a substitute. Inappropriate sequencing - real depreciation before the
establishment of key preconditions for an investment response - could ex---pose the economy to a spiral of weak supply responses and macroeconomic
instability.
POLICY ASSIGNMENT

We turn now to the policy objective of achieving an undervalued shilling
over periods longer than the short term (e.g. a year or more). The central
point is that the real exchange rate is an endogenous variable. The full range
of macroeconomic shocks and policies affects its value over time. Fiscal policy
is among the most important determinants of the equilibrium real exchange
rate at all horizons, operating primarily on the demand side in the short to
medium run, via the size and non-traded/traded composition of government
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spending (Edwards, 1989).^^ Monetary policy, in contrast, is generally viewed
as incapable of affecting the level of any real variable in the long run. This sug
gests that cases of successful real exchange rate targeting are highly likely to
have involved fiscal actions that eventually bore the brunt of sustaining target
values for the real exchange rate.
A return to Figure 8.7 underlines this point. The most dramatic difference
between Kenya and the third-party group is in the levels of saving and invest
ment. Moreover, this difference operates not just on average - year in and year
out - but also over the period since 2002, when Kenya's real exchange rate
diverges from that of the third-party group. Kenya's investment boom over
this subperiod was financed externally, whereas a similar investment boom
among third-party competitors was financed internally. To the degree that Vi
sion 2030 anticipates a continued strong contribution from foreign financing,
it does not look like a 'weak exchange rate' strategy, at least in the early stages.
Avoiding an equilibrium real appreciation that undermines export competi
tiveness will require a policy environment that is conducive to a high rate of
saving out of income growth.
A final point on policy assignment relates to the distinction we made in the
previous section between regulatory policies and the use of traditional stabili
zation instruments. Above, we emphasized the concept of ex ante vuinerability to reversals of capital flows and provided some corroboration of indicators
proposed in the literature. Regulatory actions that reduce vulnerability can
reduce the macroeconomic risks associated with episodes of real exchange ap
preciation or depreciation. This responsibility should not be overlooked in the
midst of debate over policies that operate directly on the real exchange rate.
RECONCILING REAL EXCHANGE RATE TARGETS WITH INFLATION
TARGETS

Finally, what are the macroeconomic consequences of using conventional
monetary policy instruments to maintain a weaker real exchange rate than
would otherwise be the case? Both theory and experience suggest that, when
the capital account is relatively open, using monetary policy in this mode
requires the central bank to accept a higher rate of inflation than would oth
erwise prevail, at least at the outset (Calvo et al., 1995). A weak shilling policy
could therefore come into sharp tension with the CBK's existing framework,
with its long-standing inflation target of 5 per cent.
The logic of this view is straightforward, and relies on demand-side ef
fects of the type featured in the Dutch disease literature. Achieving a per
sistent effect on the real exchange rate requires altering the equilibrium real
exchange rate, which in turn means altering the demand-and-supply balance
in the market for non-traded goods. A fortuitous move in the fundamentals
- a shock to foreign financing, for example, or to commodity export prices
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- can of course generate the required effect. During the 1990s, for example,
conflicts with external donors led to sharp reductions in official development
assistance (ODA) in Kenya; other things being equal, these reductions drove
down overall spending; part of this fell on non-traded goods, generating a real
depreciation.
If monetary policy alone is going to achieve a similar effect, however, mon
etary instruments must be capable of reducing national spending on nontraded goods. How this is done depends on the degree of capital mobility.
When capital mobility is low, a period of tight money and high real interest
rates does the job, provided that the fiscal impacts of the higher public debt
service can be handled through higher taxes. But when capital mobility is
high, monetary policy has little traction over the real interest rate. In this case,
the mechanism emphasized by Calvo et al. (1995) is a temporary increase in
the rate of crawl of the nominal exchange rate, for the duration of the under
valuation episode. This produces a temporary increase in the nominal interest
rate and therefore - as cash is needed for purchasing consumer goods - in the
effective price of consumption. Consumption falls, and with it the demand
for non-traded goods and the real exchange rate.^^
The likelihood of an increase in inflation suggests that actively targeting an
undervalued shilling would require a substantial adaptation in Kenya's mon
etary framework, which is currently constructed around an inflation target of
5 per cent or below. Widening the inflation band would re-pose the nominal
anchor issues discussed in Chapter 7, and the cost of this might reasonably
be viewed as too great. Like any consensus about a complex issue of insti
tutional design, however, the consensus that continues to support inflation
targeting among emerging market economies reflects the environment that
produced it, most notably the Great Inflation among the industrial countries
and the rise in global capital mobility. Two broadly competing visions ex
ist - one largely discredited by experience, and the other likely, in our view,
to remain a focus of debate. The discredited vision is that central banks can
reconcile price stability with competing objectives - including providing am
ple finance to government - through the use of direct controls in credit and
foreign exchange markets. Even Malaysia, widely cited for its use of capital
controls in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, retains a strong pref
erence for fiscal stability, prudential regulations over direct controls, and the
maintenance of convertibility for current account purposes (Edwards, 2007).
The second competing vision is over how tightly countries should commit
to themselves to very low inflation. Even before the global financial crisis
of 2008, this issue was more clearly resolved for industrial countries than it
was for developing countries. The global evidence suggests that high inflation
- 40 per cent was the benchmark used by Bruno and Easterly (1998) - is clearly
damaging to long-run growth, and that for industrial countries, the optimal
range for inflation, in terms of long-run growth, is quite low (positive but
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below 5 per cent). But for low-income countries, the growth benefits of mov
ing from an inflation rate of 10-15 per cent to one of 5 per cent or below (for
example) appear to be small, and may even be slightly negative. This debate is
likely to be renewed with vigour if one or more industrial countries choose an
inflationary exit from burdensome domestic currency debts.
In practice, of course, there may be propitious episodes during which de
velopments in the macroeconomic fundamentals allow the CBK to lean heav
ily against the shilling while satisfying inflation targets. A resolution of po
litical uncertainties in Kenya, for example, would not only reduce the cost
of external finance for Kenya and enhance the prospects of achieving Vision
2030, but also potentially generate a sustained increase in the demand for
shilling-denominated assets, including bank deposits. In such a situation, a
policy of reserve accumulation may be well justified within an inflation target
ing framework, even at the risk of violating preset money growth targets, as
an alternative to an overshooting appreciation that harms exports and growth
(Buffie et al, 2004). The role of the real exchange rate in export competitive
ness suggests that the CBK should be alert to such opportunities.

8.4 Conclusions
Kenya embraced an open capital account in the hope of widening portfo
lio opportunities for domestic residents, attracting foreign finance, and spur
ring financial development. The trilemma was broadly acknowledged from
the outset, in the realization that, if monetary policy was to have any scope
for domestic objectives, an open capital account was inconsistent with the
maintenance of a heavily managed exchange rate. As outlined in Chapter 7,
the framework introduced in the mid-1990s has reproduced itself successfully
over time: an inflation target pursued via money base targeting, a marketdetermined exchange rate, and an intervention policy geared towards con
taining short-run market volatility rather than guiding the path of the real
exchange rate.

Vision 2030 anticipates a substantial increase in private external capital
flows, and we have focused in this chapter on two related challenges for mon
etary policy. The first of these, managing macroeconomic volatility, is central
to the CBK's stated mission and to the macroeconomic stability pillar of Vi
sion 2030. The second, supporting export competitiveness, is suggested by
the role of exports in high-growth countries and the prominence of national
competitiveness in Vision 2030. These broad concerns will be inherited by a
regional central bank should currency union proceed on a fast track, and for
this reason, we have not dealt separately with issues of monetary integration.
Our overriding message is that there are limitations to what monetary pol
icy can accomplish without compromising its central roles of maintaining a
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nominal anchor and supporting a competitive and robust financial system.
This is clearest with respect to real exchange rate targets, where Rodrik (2008)
and others have argued that an undervalued exchange rate provides a marketbased substitute for industrial policy in promoting non-traditional exports
and productivity-enhancing FDl. If, however, other determinants of the in
vestment environment are the binding constraints on these activities, as we
believe they are, then the macroeconomic costs of subordinating exchange
rate targets to inflation targets are likely to be high. We have also argued that
the truly indispensable interventions to support a competitive real exchange
rate are those that increase national saving, which is fundamentally a task of
fiscal rather than monetary policy.
With respect to macroeconomic stability, we have focused on the degree of
capital mobility and its implications for monetary policy. The evidence sug
gests that capital moves less readily into Kenya than might be expected given
its largely open capital account. This is particularly worrisome with respect to
FDI, where direct restrictions are absent and the potential advantages in terms
of an employment- and export-promoting growth profile are large. Although
most of the determinants of FDI are outside the CBK's control, restrictions on
non-residents may serve to discourage long-term commitments even in the
absence of direct controls on FDI itself. Restrictions on short-term borrowing
by banks, in turn, are more readily justified on macroeconomic grounds given
the economic costs of a sudden reversal.
Although the evidence we have presented places Kenya well short of the
trilemma, we find that capital flows respond to interest rate differentials, ex
change rate expectations, and uncertainties about the domestic political proc
ess. These effects may well be non-linear, allowing the CBK to achieve con
siderable short-term smoothing of the exchange rate during normal times but
proving illusory in the presence of large shocks. A strategy for keeping these
interventions selective and temporary has the advantages of avoiding confu
sion regarding the CBK's nominal anchor, allowing necessary real exchange
rate adjustments to take place, and providing ongoing incentives for the de
velopment of private markets for exchange risk. Within such a strategy, how
ever, the CBK should be alert to opportunities to resist large and transitory
real appreciations when this can be done without compromising the inflation
anchor. The first such opportunity may come as global markets emerge from
the financial crisis, if a resolution of political uncertainties in Kenya produces
a large portfolio adjustment in favour of the shilling.

Notes
1 We are grateful to Christopher Adam for extensive guidance and suggestions, and
to Aart Kraay for providing us with data from Kraay and Nehru (2006). Any errors
are our own responsibility.
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2 Article VIII status embodies a commitment not to impose exchange controls on
3

current account transactions.
Like most measures of de jure openness, the IMF indicators reflect only the pres
ence or absence of controls, rather than their intensity. Chinn and Ito (2008) try to
capture intensity indirectly, by including controls on the current account (often a
conduit for unrecorded capital movements) and adjusting for the duration of capi

tal account restrictions.
4 The other seven are Botswana, Djibouti, Gambia, Liberia, Mauritius, Uganda, and
Zambia.
5 These data should be treated with care. Capital flows are notoriously difficult to
measure, particularly where they are illegal. Accounting conventions can also differ
substanfially across countries.
6 Table D12.8, p. 222 reports the ICRG index of government stability for 2006. At 5.9,
Kenyans value was the lowest in the table, 2.4 standard deviations below the average
of 9.4 for the other sixteen emerging market comparators.
7 This is sometimes referred to as the 'Guidotti-Greenspan rule'.
8 If domestic interest rates are market determined, however, it is unlikely that capital
controls alone can explain a persistently negative risk premium. The reason is that
domestic investors have the alternative of investing in other domestic assets. Low
market-determined rates on government securities may reflect, at least in part, regu
lations that compel banks and other financial firms to hold these securities.
9 A more sophisticated approach would incorporate the transmission channel from
the repo rate to the T-bill rate. The evidence regarding policy transmission from
policy to market rates is mixed. Cheng (2006) finds that the interest rate channel
is weak, and attributes this to structural limitations in Kenya's financial sector. Maturu (2007) finds greater evidence of effective transmission from the repo rate to
money market rates including the T-bill rate.
10 Countries may of course have felt compelled to do the opposite - to cut interest
rates in order to act as lender of last resort to the banking sector. In either case, the
interest rate response belongs in the dependent variable.
11 In Equation (8.6), reserves and the exchange rate are both measured in US dollars
and at the end of the month. The discount rate is a monthly average.
12 By these criteria, Kenya experienced eighteen years of debt distress between 1975
and 2002, the most recent associated with a combination of arrears and Paris Club
debt relief in 2000-02 (Kraay and Nehru, 2006).
13 Rose and Spiegel (2009) report a similarly mixed result for the significance of size
and income. In their sample, which includes the industrial countries, there is some
evidence that the smaller countries were harder hit.
14 From this perspective, the impressive rate of FDI into Tanzania and Uganda by Ken
yan firms raises questions about the overall investment environment in Kenya, as
these firms could serve the regional market from Kenya.
15 The real exchange rate is sometimes defined as the price of domestic goods rela
tive to foreign goods, measured in a common currency. These parallel concepts are
known as the 'internal' and 'external' real exchange rate (see Hinkle and Montiel,
1999).
16 They mean the most popular formal real target, for example via announced or un
announced purchasing power parity (PPP) rules that adjust the rate of crawl vis-d-vis
a currency or baskef to the difference between domestic and foreign inflation.
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17 The Reinhart and Rogoff classification is based solely on observed exchange rate
movements, and therefore does not distinguish sharply between regimes that im
plement PPP rules or other formal approaches to real exchange rate targeting (the
topic of Section 8.3.3), and regimes that limit short-run exchange rate volatility
while allowing considerable medium- to long-term movement in the real exchange
rate. Kenya maintains a formal target of four months of imports, and the CBK is
therefore in the foreign exchange markets intermittently for reserve management
purposes. This may provide cover for modest interventions that smooth out ex
tremes, without implying any sustained commitment to a particular path for the
real exchange rate.
18 Eichengreen (2008) surveys the empirical literature on real exchange rate volatility
and growth and finds mixed results; some studies find a negative relationship be
tween the two variables, and others conclude that exchange rate variability has no
impact. Causality is often unclear, he argues, because macroeconomic crises tend to
be associated with large real exchange rate changes.
19 Eichengreen (2008) notes the rapid development of these markets following the
Asian financial crisis and the transition to greater exchange rate flexibility in af
fected countries.
20 The appendix can be downloaded from http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/soconnel/research.html.
21 In the appendix (see note 20), we develop a second comparison versus the thirdparty group based on a measure of absolute price competitiveness developed by
Johnson et al. (2007). This measure has the advantage of being directly comparable
across countries. It evolves similarly over time to REER3p, and indicates that Ken
yan prices were overvalued by roughly 20 per cent vis-a-vis the third-party group in
2007.
22 Consistent with this, Maturu (2002) finds that the degree of exchange rate mis
alignment during the mid- to late 1990s, following financial sector liberalization
and adoption of the market-determined exchange rate, was not substantially differ
ent from patterns observed in the pre-liberalization period of the 1980s.
23 Recent studies of real exchange rate misalignment in Kenya have generated mixed
results. Mwega (2007) reports an overvaluation of 40.8 per cent in 2005, with up
dated results suggesting a continued large overvaluation in 2006 and 2007. But Pollin and Helntz (2007) find milder degrees of misalignments in the mid-2000s, and
the IMF (2008) shows an undervaluation in 2006-07. Where these authors agree is
on the importance of non-monetary determinants of export performance.
24 The medium- to long-term impact of fiscal policy on the real exchange rate operates
primarily via the supply side and is much less well understood. Adam and Bevan
(2006) emphasize the importance of how public infrastructure investment affects
sectoral productivities.
25 Lizondo (1991) and Montiel and Ostry (1991) develop models in which the mone
tary authority can engineer a permanent real depreciation by increasing the inflation
rate. In these models, however, it is ultimately a fiscal rather than a monetary effect
that generates the real depreciation. The increase in inflation generates a transfer of
seigniorage revenues to the government, which is assumed to spend less intensively
on non-traded goods than the private sector does.
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